

# Challenges and Psychological Dynamics of Negotiating Risks in Failed States:

# THE SOMALI CASE

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**F**ollowing a civil war and a drought, 350,000 Somalis had died by 1992. In response to a United Nations request for help, the United States sent Marines to secure the environment (UNOSOM—Operation Restore Hope). This initial effort was followed by UNOSOM II, a more ambitious UN mandate to disarm militias and reconcile political factions. This paper examines the decision-making, the effect of *Conflicting Personalities*, and the role of the unconscious as seen in the *Non-Verbal Leak*. The personality of former President Mohammed Farah Aided is analyzed in the context of the aforementioned conflict. An explanation of the relevance (or lack of one) of the interlocutors, the negotiating styles and venues, and the negotiating objectives is discussed.

Pictured here: A member of the Nigerian contingent of UNOSOM II surveying the city of Mogadishu from his post at Police Headquarters.



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After studying this article, participants should be better able to do the following:

1. Better understand the key role that personality plays in international crisis.
2. Understand the dilemma faced by international organizations attempting to bring aid to this region.
3. Understand the role of the unconscious process in world affairs.
4. Understand this historical development of the regional conflict.
5. Gain insight into methods of “reading” Non-Verbal Leaks.

**KEY WORDS:** terrorism, warlord, civil war, non-state actor, Aideed, Sahnoun, Mahdi, Oakley, Clarke, NGO, UNITAF, UNOSOM, Restore Hope, Usama bin Laden, Boutros Boutros Ghali, Siad Barre, United Nations, Clinton, Jonah, NVL, Non-Verbal Leak, unconscious

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## Introduction

As the world tried to deal with international crises following the end of the Cold War, the humanitarian intervention in Somalia has become all the more relevant as the war on terrorism brings countries with weak or no central governments to the forefront of international attention. In this article we will attempt to identify the unique challenges to negotiating risks, together with their underlying psychological dynamics, when dealing with states that lack central authority.

From the initial negotiations between local warlords and officers of the American Central Intelligence Agency over safe landing for planes carrying food aid to the negotiations for the safe release of hostages following a watershed battle on October 3, 1993, the United Nations as well as Somali authorities tried to reach their objectives and manage their risks through a combination of force and negotiations. However, without the Cold War to structure UN and individual states' actions, without clear and committed Somali interlocutors, with a multiplicity of diverse state and non-state actors, and without clear precedents, humanitarian intervention in Somalia proceeded in a disjointed manner. There were tactical successes, but Somalia continues to be a lawless state.


There were few “negotiations” in the formal sense. Most issues were discussed and bargained over, sometimes on a daily basis. However, these meetings—negotiations were essential to the United Nations' limited success.

Throughout, this case exemplifies the “behavior” theory of risk assessment rather than the statistical approach. Therefore, some focus will be given to the actors involved. This part of the article will first provide a historical setting, then focus on several specific issues where negotiations played a significant role, and provide this writer's conclusions.

## Historical Overview

Somalia became a nation in 1960, after ten years as a UN Trust Territory. The United Somali Congress (USC) emerged as the strongest armed faction from a civil war that erupted in 1991. The country became a quagmire of competing armed militias. The most politically relevant were those that emerged from the civil war with the most weapons, followers, and territory. By the end of 1992, the war and a drought had killed about 350,000 Somalis; another 1.5 million were in danger of starvation. International relief groups tried to mitigate the human suffering but were largely unsuccessful because of the uncontrolled security situation.

In 1992, the Security Council approved the deployment of 50 unarmed observers to monitor a tenuous cease-fire and established the **United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I)** to begin the UN's humanitarian effort. However, the security situation again kept the UN from delivering food and supplies. Responding to the UN's appeals, U.S. President Bush proposed sending combat troops to lead an international UN force to secure the environment for relief operations.



The UN agreed, and the first of 25,000 U.S. Marines (**UNITAF, also called Operation Restore Hope**) landed on the beaches in December. Its purpose was to open supply routes, get food moving, and prepare the way for a UN peacekeeping force. UNITAF eventually included forces from 24 countries.

UNOSOM II took over from the U.S.-led UNITAF in May of 1992, with troops from 30 nations. UNOSOM II's mandate included disarmament and nation-building. **But UN troops lost their reputation for impartiality acquired earlier by UNITAF and, to the local players, became a foreign presence taking sides in the conflict.**

The catalyst for the transformation of the UN/U.S. presence into hostile player status was an attack on Pakistani peacekeepers inspecting a weapons warehouse in June of 1993, by the Aideed faction. The UN then put a bounty on Aideed's head, and a unit of U.S. commandos became the point of the spear to capture Aideed. A battle erupted on October 3 between U.S. commandos and Aideed's militia, with the recently claimed assistance of Usama bin Laden. U.S. President Clinton sent more troops as short-term reinforcements but declared that U.S. troops would be withdrawn by March 31, 1994. Aideed died from bullet wounds in Mogadishu on August 1, 1994.

In 2002, Somalia still did not have a central government. The military factions are now too busy with internal fighting among sub-clan militias to fight each other. A **Transitional National Government (TNG)** was established in 2001, as the result of a conference of clan representatives, intellectuals, former civil servants, and several warlords. Other warlords, including the son of Mohamed Aideed, Hussein Aideed, oppose the TNG through the **Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council (SRRC)** backed by Ethiopia. A main Western focus on Somalia is whether its permissive environment is being used by Al Qaeda.

### **Operational Challenges to Negotiating Risks**

Among the challenges to negotiating risks in the context of humanitarian aid to failed states are the large number of actors and the resulting complexities of the decision-making process, the difficulty in identifying the relevant interlocutors, the incompatible negotiating styles, the significance of the negotiating venues, and the divergent



▲ A Somali mother nurses her baby while waiting for food at a UNICEF/Swede Relief feeding centre in Mogadishu.

objectives of the two sides. The risks being negotiated ranged from stopping the loss of life, to assuring the safety of the aid workers, and to losing the political constituencies for the effort. On the Somali side, the risks involved famine for the population at large and political power for the leaders.

**Numerous State and Non-State Actors**—Most of the major international donor Non-Government Organizations were present in Somalia even before UN involvement. And while the United States was the major state actor, it was not alone. The Security Council members were active decision-makers and 30 countries eventually provided troops.

Paradoxically, involving more member states spread the risk among them but also

increased the need for effective communication and actually decreased coordination and project coherence.

**Decision-Making, Coordination, and Communication**—One of the constant problems on the UN side was the difficulty in communicating to the various chains of command and coordinating the military, political, and humanitarian efforts. For example, once U.S., part of UNITAF, forces landed, the major military force was no longer under direct UN command. Furthermore, the U.S. commando unit brought at UN request to implement a UN resolution, the capture of Aideed, answered to both its Central Command headquarters in the United States and to the U.S. military commander in Somalia who also

served as the deputy UN commander. But U.S. support units—engineers, communications, and logistics—were under a U.S. general who answered directly to a Turkish general in charge of UNOSOM II. And UN representatives in charge of political reconciliation efforts were separate from the military chain of command, thus marginalizing them.

The resignation of Ambassador Sahnoun, UN special representative to Somalia in 1992, serves to illustrate the communications problem. An experienced and able diplomat, Sahnoun had obtained Aideed's agreement after intense negotiations for 500 peacekeepers in August. Later that month, however, both Sahnoun and Aideed learned by way of the BBC that the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and the SC, had increased the number from 500 to 3,500. Aideed was enraged, feeling that he had been duped, and Sahnoun was astonished. His credibility was damaged, to say the least. Sahnoun later resigned his position, as he did not believe the policies imposed by New York headquarters made sense with the situation on the ground; he also disagreed with these policies because of the lack of coherent communications between his mission, the SC, the Somalis, the UN relief agencies, and the NGOs that he had nevertheless worked hard to improve.

On the other hand, Aideed was always in personal control of negotiations on all issues.

**Conflicting Personalities**—The end of the civil war did not bring a national government into power. Instead, several warlords were pretenders to the throne. Two were stronger than others: Ali Mahdi Mohammed and Mohammed Farah Aideed. Both belonged to the Hawiye clan but to different sub-clans. Mahdi, a businessman and gentleman farmer, was a spokesman for the trades' people of the Hawiye Abgal, the majority population in the pre-civil war Mogadishu area. Aideed, a former general in Siad Barre's army who also spent seven years in jail and then served as ambassador to India, had led his mostly Hawiye Habr Gidr irregular forces successfully during the civil war. In short, both aspired to the presidency—especially Aideed, who thought of himself as Somalia's savior and was far stronger militarily than Mahdi.

**The personality factor came into play almost immediately to affect negotiations.** Immediately prior to handing over his responsibilities to Boutros Boutros-

Ghali, Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar sent his Under-Secretary-General James Jonah to visit Somalia in January 1992. As a result, the SC received a letter from Somalia's UN mission in New York transmitting a request from Somali's "interim Prime Minister," Ali Mahdi, that the topic of Somalia be included on the SC agenda. What the letter did not ask was significant and an augury of things to come. Jonah had met with both Aideed and Mahdi but was unable to convince Aideed to request the UN to involve itself in establishing a cease-fire between his and Mahdi's militias.

The new UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali then invited the two leaders to New York. While they did not speak to each other, they agreed through Boutros-Ghali's good offices to a cease-fire, although Aideed declined to support the deployment of foreign troops. Because Aideed did not believe he was treated with the proper impartiality during the negotiations, the cease-fire did not actually take place until March 1992, two months later.

Aideed's actions were affected not only by his political ambitions and his negative perceptions of Jonah, but also by a deep seated animosity toward Boutros-Ghali. The latter had served as Egyptian head of diplomacy and had been in the forefront of Egyptian financial support to the previous Somali government led by Siad Barre. Aideed therefore always considered him hostile.

**Questionable Interlocutors**—There were two groups of potentially relevant negotiating partners: the traditional village and regional councils of elders, and the armed militias. The UN side actually dealt with both, depending on the issue. However, there was no question that the warlords were the final arbiters on the Somali side.

In the absence of a legally-sanctioned local authority, the actions of the international force could be governed exclusively by the UN. However, success dictated a certain level of coordination in order to co-opt local de facto leaders. Although the UN tried to pursue a policy of impartiality, it was necessary to negotiate with certain groups and choosing those interlocutors tended to immediately confer international legitimacy on them. For example, going back to the beginning of UN involvement, Jonah's initial task had been to decide with whom to consult regarding the UN's possible role.

Since he didn't stray far from Mogadishu, he ended up talking only with the Mahdi and Aideed factions, thus exacerbating their mutual hostilities. And at the end of the day, Aideed did not give Jonah high marks for impartiality when Jonah announced Mahdi's agreement to the deployment of UN military observers to monitor a cease-fire and indicated UN support for Mahdi's request for foreign troops in Mogadishu. Aideed's subsequent cooperation with the UN was seriously affected by his perception of Jonah's performance.

**Negotiating Styles and Venues**—The negotiating methods of the UN participants came from the traditions of European diplomacy consisting of scheduled conferences, more or less well-established agendas, and binding decisions even on those who are not totally onboard. Somali political culture had a history of conflict management through "ongoing consultations, assemblies, and negotiations" where negotiations were a process rather than a single event. These grassroots meetings drew on the circle of traditional leaders and methods. These negotiations normally took place near the area of conflict. On the other hand, the militia leaders preferred their conflict management to take place in the hotels of Nairobi and Addis Ababa, where no one had a home court advantage. Other social leaders either were not present or were there as observers. In the end it is not clear that one method was more successful. The UN also provided financial support to each of the participating Somalis for these international conferences, a not unimportant motivator to convince Somalis that another conference was needed. "With so much money to be made from staging peace conferences, peace building soon degenerated into a cynical cottage industry dominated by entrepreneurial Somali politicians" (Menkhouse, 1997, p. 46).

Political reconciliation (a UNOSOM II objective) touched the perceived vital interests of the armed militias and was difficult to negotiate. In fact, whether the UN method was incremental or more encompassing, failure seemed to be the norm, even if there were short-term agreements. For example, the Addis Ababa Conference on National reconciliation of March 1993, brought together the fifteen militia factions under the sponsorship of UNOSOM. Agreement was eventually reached on the creation of district councils. However, the agreement didn't last and the

councils never were created. Another peace effort was the Jubbaland peace accord. It focused on community leaders to resolve fighting over control of the Lower Jubba Valley and the important port of Kismayu. Militias from outside the region engaged the fighting. An accord was reached in August 1993, after two months of meetings in Kismayu attended by 154 communal leaders. However, the conflict erupted again in February 1994; the elders were unable to force the two militias to adhere to the accord. UNOSOM then tried to simply broker a comprehensive deal between the most powerful militias in the country to solve the Kismayu conflict and use it as a template for national reconciliation. In May 1994, the then UN Special Representative Lansana Kouyate sealed the accord in Nairobi by saying, "The warlords are now peacelords," an optimistic conclusion not borne out by subsequent events (as cited in Menkhous, 1997, p. 53); the national reconciliation conference pledged in Nairobi never took place.

**Objectives**—From the outset there were objectives that were not always entirely compatible, thus emphasizing the need for, and presenting serious challenges to, the concept of negotiating. As far as U.S. participation was concerned, pressure on Bush from the media, from Congress, from the NGOs, and from the Clinton camp during the presidential electoral campaign was significant and he decided to involve the U.S. President-elect Clinton, who agreed immediately with Bush's decision. Clinton was inaugurated about a month later in January 1992. As his political goals were often determined by opinion surveys, he was undoubtedly aware of the media impact caused by reports of the 300,000 dead, either killed by the civil war or by starvation. Following the disastrous loss of life in the October 3 firefight (18 American commandos killed, one dragged through the streets of Mogadishu on worldwide TV, and hundreds of Somali casualties), the Clinton administration's goals changed. Following Congressional hearings and considerable criticism for letting this mission get away from him, it was time to cut political losses and Clinton decided to get out.

The international participants had a variety of motivations and objectives. Bruno Delaye, a Parisian National Center for Scientific Research professor and head of the African unit in the French president's office, states:

You see, it is soon going to be Christmas and it would be unthinkable to have the French public eat its Christmas dinner while seeing on TV all those starving kids. It would be politically disastrous. Then I phoned several of our African friends, such as Houphouet Boigny, Diouf, Bongo, and Biya. They all agreed; as Francophone Heads of State, they would look ridiculous in Africa if the Americans went and we stayed home. (as cited in Prunier, 1997, p. 135)

In truth, there might have been as many specific sets of motivations as there were UN participants ranging from the politically self-serving to the truly humanitarian. Prunier states his own conclusion on European motives:

Their participation could be qualified as a sort of NATO-cum Desert Storm syndrome: Each involved European country had a prudent desire for "solidarity" with the U.S. giant, a need to appear "caring" in the eyes of domestic public opinion saturated with horrifying TV picture, a preoccupation—especially following the coalition war against Iraq the year before—with displaying its armed forces in an attractively humanitarian role, and a feeling that its rank as a "power" (even secondary) was linked with membership in the Restore Hope club. (1997, p. 136)

Once engaged, the initial objective was obvious: feed the hungry. However, it was necessary to negotiate with the Somali power brokers to begin since they considered food an instrument of power. However, political reconciliation (essentially asking the militias to play nice) turned out to be the "show-stopper."

**The objectives of the Somali warlords were less complicated: use international aid to capture the leadership of the country and the acceptance of the international community.** However, negotiations were necessary even among the Somali actors. In June 1991, the USC named Mahdi as interim president of Somalia and Mahdi recognized Aideed as chairman of the USC, a careful balance of titles and power that worked in the short term. Another outcome of the USC conference was that Mahdi would form an interim government and that Aideed would form a national army. In October, Aideed changed his mind about cooperating with Mahdi, and the two fought over control of Mogadishu. By

December, a "green line" divided what remained of the city.

In his review of UN actions in Somalia, **Walter Clarke** (1997), former deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu in 1993, and now adjunct professor of peace operations at the U.S. Army's Peace-Keeping Institute, identifies other Somali objectives, which complicated the UN's role and its ability to negotiate successful outcomes:

**Gaining legitimacy from the intervening force**—Describing the frequent meetings between a U.S. diplomat, Special Presidential Envoy Robert Oakley, and Aideed, Clarke states "these gestures were permitted to develop into a one-sided relationship favorable only to a communal leader whose crimes against his own people were less known."

**Maintenance of local power bases**—Frequent meetings with U.S. diplomats allowed Aideed to claim that he was the chosen next leader of Somalia.

**Neutralization of enemies**—Aideed successfully convinced UNITAF to drive a hostile clan out of Kismayu in March 1993.

**Enhanced credibility through special relationships**—Aideed managed to have cameras on hand to record the frequent visits of U.S. and UN officials to his headquarters and replay them in the media to underline and publicize his essential role.

**International standing and recognition**—UN-sponsored conferences in Nairobi and Addis Ababa allowed the participating warlords to demonstrate international standing. (Clarke & Herbst, 1997, pp. 3-19)

## Conclusions

The role and significance of negotiating risks in the Somali situation were affected by both the operational aspects discussed above, as well as by larger issues that the negotiators could not control.

The UN underestimated the size of the problem and the level of commitment that would be necessary to succeed. While NGOs had been active in Somalia for at least 18 months trying to mitigate the starvation and disease, and while there was interest at the UN level in "doing something," principal UN members approached their own involvement with hesitation and reluctance. There were few, if any, compelling strate-

**Problems and solutions**



**AIRPORTS**

The military has set up an air-traffic control system and generator-powered lighting at the Mogadishu airport. It is also refurbishing an old Soviet-built airfield between Mogadishu and Baidoa for use by transport flights. At Mogadishu and Baidoa airfields, runways must be repaired and aprons widened using large, interlocking sheets of aluminum matting. Planes can be refueled on the ground if fuel is brought in; otherwise, in midair or in nearby nations, possibly Djibouti.



**SEAPORTS**

The relatively shallow Mogadishu harbor can handle only one large vessel at a time. Preparing the port for unloading operations means setting up generator-powered lighting, as well as other infrastructure repairs. The smaller port at Kismayo and its airfield may be used by troops from countries other than the United States.



**ROADS**

Relief shipments must be moved inland by truck, escorted by military convoys, over poor, unpaved roads, some of them mined. Construction corps may have to grade roads, repair bridges and sweep for mines.



**RELIEF OPERATIONS**

Private relief agencies will continue to distribute food and provide medical care to the starving, with the military providing security at distribution and feeding centers and escorting food convoys. Military may help relief agencies open new feeding centers.



**FEEDING TROOPS**

At first the troops will eat primarily MREs, meals-ready-to-eat. To start, the Marines, Army and Navy ordered 402,000. After Dec. 20, these will be supplemented with rations of heated, prepared foods. Mobile kitchens will be set up to heat rations and cook other foods.



**HOUSING TROOPS**

Troops will be housed at the U.S. Embassy and other existing buildings, in tent cities and aboard ships. Tents, showers, field galleys and toilets must be set up at base camps.



**MEDICAL CARE**

Medical care for the troops will be handled aboard ships or on the ground. The USS Ranger and the USS Tripoli have surgeons, operating rooms and a total of 192 hospital beds on board. Field support surgical groups could set up field hospitals on the ground. Medical care for Somalis will continue to be handled by relief agencies.


SOURCES: Army Materiel Command, Camp Pendleton, CARE, Defense Logistics Agency, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Marine Corps, Navy Seabees

# Operation Restore Hope: The logistical challenges

Somalia compared to the United States



The deployment of 28,000 U.S. troops in Somalia is much more of a Hurricane Andrew-style relief effort than a Persian Gulf-style military action. The greatest challenge lies not in armed resistance but in logistics. The United States is deploying to feed the hungry in a country with as many people as Georgia, a country in which a country in which there is very little food, water, electricity or fuel, no government and no rule of law.



**What troops must bring**

**THE BASICS**

- Food, field kitchens
- Refrigeration equipment
- Water and water-purification equipment
- Canteens
- Desert uniforms
- Tents
- Sleeping bags
- Showers
- Toilets
- Hospital facilities
- Medical supplies

**SECURITY**

- Fighter jets and transport aircraft
- Attack and transport helicopters
- M1A1 tanks and armored personnel carriers
- Humvee vehicles
- TOW missiles
- Artillery and mortar
- Mine detectors
- M-16, M-60 and Squad automatic weapons
- 9mm pistols
- Ammunition
- Gas masks
- Night vision goggles
- Chemical suits
- Barbed wire

**TRANSPORTATION AND RELIEF OPERATIONS**

- Heavy haulers
- Cargo trucks
- Fuel tankers
- Forklifts
- Tires and spare parts
- Generators and lights
- Communications systems
- Backhoes and graders
- Dump trucks and front-end loaders
- Tractors and excavators
- Fuel
- Global positioning systems
- Computers and administrative supplies
- Maintenance supplies

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gic imperatives; Somalia did not fall in any country's "vital interest" zone, nor could the Cold War template be applied. Because the outside world was pushed into trying to help—by political pressures rather than pulled by traditional reasons of self interest, motivations were brittle and short-term. There was no interest in staying in Somalia for the long haul, and the estimate of the required time horizon on the part of the UN

and its members was much too short. This factor had a significant effect on the effectiveness of negotiations; Aideed knew that his best strategy was to use the international interest in his favor, as much as he could and to wait until the United States and the UN pulled out in frustration or because of diminished interest.

With UNOSOM II, the UN slid almost without notice from a relatively low-risk re-

gime during the initial, humanitarian effort to a high-risk level as its goals changed to peacekeeping and political reconciliation. The UN's estimate and assumptions preceding UNOSOM II were badly flawed. Where Aideed and other warlords were willing to negotiate/discuss how and when food and medical aid would be dispensed, they were less willing to engage in a process that could rob them of their power.

The ideals reflected in the UN Charter should not be assumed to be embraced by the Somalis of the world. It was clear throughout this experience that, to Aideed and others, the hundreds of thousand killed by famine and fighting were of little importance compared with achieving political power. Because the UN's level of commitment was insufficient, so were its tools and methods when the warlords perceived the risks to their vital interests to have increased measurably. Negotiations had helped to save lives under a humanitarian mission, but proved inadequate to deal with peacekeeping and nation building.

The vital risk to be mitigated in part through negotiation was the cost in lives if the problem was ignored. The global community clearly is not ready to take full responsibility for failed or weak states.

The perception of eventual failure was a risk in that it could, and did, have profound impact on the future of humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. While certain parts of the overall operation were successful, the U.S. withdrawal following the battle of October 3, 1993, certainly shaped U.S. thinking against peacekeeping as a valid foreign policy goal. Because of its experience in Somalia, the United States was not willing, until recently in its military operations against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, to engage in an operation that might result in U.S. casualties. This led to air-only operations in Kosovo and its reluctance to commit in similar ventures in Africa. "A new and debilitating doctrine was born. Ever since Mogadishu the view has been that the United States won't tolerate casualties in humanitarian operation" (Crocker, 1999). And the claim by Usama bin Laden that the U.S. failure was his victory (because he allegedly helped to train and equip Somali militias) has significant resonance in the Muslim world, giving strength to the radical Islamist movement and encouraging its members to believe that history is on its side in its fight against the non-Muslim world.

**The impact of the political process' eventual failure is evident today in that Somalia still lacks a central government.** The area's lawlessness has attracted terrorists and pirates. Summarizing, when vital interests are opaque, political will is weak. When one side is dominant but diffuses its power, a more focused but weaker opponent has the upper hand. The Somali case was the United States' re-introduction to asymmetrical warfare.

### **The Somalia Case: High Risk Negotiating With High Risk People**

A failed state means a breakdown of the structures of legitimate governmental power on all levels. Warlords on land fight each other for power and position while pirates plunder shipping lanes with virtual impunity. The successful intervention by the United States Navy of the *Maersk Alabama* was a notable exception, as is that of other country's navies.

### **A Retrospective Analysis Using The Non-Verbal Leak**

Negotiations broke down, and people died. This story overshadowed the evolutionary development of mankind's endeavors to grow and develop. In hindsight, we can deduce **individual psychopathology** at the heart of many of the world's recent conflicts. Hitler, Idi Amin, Bin Laden, Milosevic, and Saddam Hussein all had troubled backgrounds as youths.

This fact in itself does not guarantee psychopathology or even an unwillingness to negotiate. It does suggest, however, that **psychological factors are important variables to consider** when attempting to understand and negotiate conflicts from personal to international levels.

In the negotiation process, people bring expectations based upon past experiences, future prospects, and their conscious and unconscious realities that constitute their basic truth. Negotiation processes reflect the person's basic efforts to win a point or position. Often there is an attempt to manipulate the situation to one's advantage by masking a hidden agenda with a "poker face" or controlled gestures and responses. Conversely, a person may overreact, reflecting an attempt to cover or divert attention away from another aspect of other dynamics within the negotiation.

The UN/U.S. forces tried to maintain objectivity in a sea of powerful provocation. Eventually the natural human tendency to infer meaning and observe with judgment resulted not in negotiation or communication, but in escalation with disastrous results.

Noted psychologist and semantics expert, Dr. William H. Pemberton (1989), observed:

There seems little need to search for examples of provocative diplomatic exchange. Read any newsprint. Listen to and watch any newscast. Someone does

something, says something, in some kind of way that insults the receiver and the predictable response escalates the insult. (p. 162)

In any high-risk negotiation, there is both internal and external pressure to reach a solution to the differences dividing the parties. When the person leading one side of delegation is psychologically disturbed or systematically sabotaging the attempts to resolve the differences, the ability to detect this behavior quickly is of critical importance. This individual may sit, silently building roadblocks to obstruct a resolution to the disagreement. A negotiator has no problem, of course, saying little or nothing. It is more difficult, however, to block the non-verbal unconscious responses that we all have. These reactions, or "leaks" as I call them, are rapid observable distinct bits of behavior that show the true unconscious feelings of the person involved in a negotiation process. These leaks can be decoded to surface the true feelings of a person with whom an individual is negotiating.

In most of the negotiation situations, we have little or no influence in choosing who will be the person or delegation on the other side of the table, let alone their mental stability. Regardless of this fact, we improve the chances of events not spiraling out of control as they did in Somalia if we can detect the signs of hidden agendas, insincerity, outright lies, or even hidden psychopathology.

Before we consider the specific Non-Verbal Leak of one of the former key players, Mohammed Farah Aideed, let us first examine the notion of the Non-Verbal Leak in general.

### **The Non-Verbal Leak (NVL) as a Tool in High Risk Negotiations**

How do those involved in critical high-risk negotiations observe the unconscious process in such a way that its driving forces can be utilized in the negotiation process? The answer is to learn to read the non-verbal messages shown that reflect the unconscious, the **Non-Verbal Leak**.

The key to understanding the unconscious is in knowing that in most cases we are ambivalent about everything. We enjoy rich food but we know it's not good for our cholesterol level and waistline. We love a person but sometimes dislike aspects of his behavior. We believe in our system of government but dislike paying for it with our taxes. To live is to be ambivalent. We

are ambivalent about our decisions on many levels. We show that ambivalence on both verbal and non-verbal levels. When we try to deny it, we usually end up showing it even more. On a verbal level, Freud called it a slip. On the non-verbal level, I call it a Non-Verbal Leak. It is a double message; moreover, it is the key to understanding our unconscious.

At various times in life, events happen that are perceived as traumatic; we reacted with decisions designed to avoid such events in the future. For example, a child gets burned on the stove and decides to be cautious around stoves in the future. On an unconscious level he may pair that event with other factors relating to that trauma. He might decide it is dangerous to be around mother when she is cooking. Later that **Perceived Primary Event (PPE)** could become generalized to include anxieties involving cooking or even women.

This is certainly not a new idea. However, to have the ability to “read” those anxieties as they exist in the here and now can often provide invaluable information at the negotiation table or in any crisis situation. The Non-Verbal Leak (NVL) that reflects the PPE is an extraordinarily rapid, repetitive, patterned series of movements recorded from the shoulders up, reflecting an unresolved primary perception and manifesting itself in a decision and a strategy from the past.

The decision and strategy were believed appropriate at the time, but the strategy, which can be thought of as the old decision with wheels influencing future actions and directions, is often maladaptive in the present. The primary factor—any event that is life threatening or perceived to be life threatening—creates a state of imbalance within the individual and reflects retention, a holding in of the tension.

**The NVL is the silent language of the unconscious**—another part of our communications repertoire—and it can be read just as any other language can be read. In fact, many people without any training at all but especially skilled and experienced negotiators seem to have a natural talent for reading NVLs. Negotiators are often keenly aware of these incongruent messages but, because they have not raised them to a conscious level of awareness, may just call them a “gut feeling.” Others have learned the so-called body language principles. They believe that a person who crosses his arms while he talks is hiding something; a

leg moving up and down, he believes, indicates aggression.

Just as our own language has patterns unique to each of us, so it is with regard to non-verbal language. A Manhattan matron may have different non-verbal gestures from a Masai matriarch; however, she may have similar Non-Verbal Leaks when it comes to reactions to fear, anger, sadness, or other basic human emotions. The critical factor to decode is the NVL relating to a basic reaction to a basic feeling.

Ekman & Rosenberg (1997), in their book, *What the Face Reveals*, offer a detailed study of reading non-verbals and the Facial Action Coding System. Their research provides significant emphasis to this Somali study:

It may be suggested that the coherence demonstrated in this study was a particular to the stimulus situation; i.e., the viewing of disgust- and fear-eliciting films, and that it might not generalize to other emotional situations. It seems unlikely that humans would have evolved with emotional response systems that behave in one way to films but differently to other emotion elicitors. This possibility seems especially remote in the light of the fact that moderate levels of coherence among behavioral, physiological, and subjective measures have been demonstrated in the very different context of marital interaction research (Levenson & Gottman, 1983; Levenson & Gottman, 1985).

We demonstrated that measurement of facial expression and self-report of specific emotions on momentary basis provides solid evidence of a coherent emotional response, especially for more intense emotional events. The source of this coherence remains unclear. It is possible that the observed coherence was internally driven, externally driven, or both. Our findings are consistent with Tomkins’s (1962) notion of emotions as correlated responses, and provide the strongest evidence to date that this is true for facial and subjective measures. (pp. 82-83)

How does a person react when he is attempting to deceive, misrepresent, or outright lie? The ability to spot a lie in a face that is a sea of stimuli is not an easy task but, with proper, adequate training, it can be done.

Ekman also references his previous research with Friesen to further emphasize the import of expressions:

Although the fact would mislead the untrained eye, “involuntary expression of emotions might leak despite a liar’s effort at disguise. The easy-to-see macro-expressions often would signal the liar’s deliberately intended false information, and the more subtle aspects of facial activity, such as micro-expressions, would nevertheless reveal true feeling. In a sense the face is equipped to lie the most and leak the most, and thus can be a very confusing source of information during deception” (Ekman & Friesen, 1969, p. 98, as cited in Ekman & Rosenberg, 1997)

A skilled negotiator could ask a few questions that he knows will cause the person with whom he is in negotiation to distort or falsify his response. For example, “Are you concerned about the outcome of this negotiation?” “Do you always win?” “Is there a hidden agenda in your position?” A few “yes” or “no” questions, custom fit to a specific negotiation situation, should surface the desired baseline of truth; and with that data the NVL can be deduced.

**When the NVL is read correctly, it can unlock many mysteries in the underlying motivations in the negotiating process.** Being able to more accurately read these messages from the unconscious does not mean that one will magically find success and happiness or, in Somalia’s case, that former warlord Mohammad Farah Aideed would acknowledge his hidden agenda(s). It does mean that those across the table could have seen clearly what others may have felt. They might have been able to use that information to redirect the negotiation process at the exact time it began to go wrong.

The human body, striving for balance by lying or trying to deceive, creates imbalance. This imbalance is both visible to the trained eye and something a negotiator can learn to see and factor into critical high-risk negotiations.

Ursula Hess and Robert E. Kleck (1997) wrote:

The literature on psycho-physiological markers of lying (e.g., Lykken, 1979) shows that deception is usually associated with increases in arousal. Nonverbal indicators of arousal, such as blinking, pupil dilation, pitch, speech errors, and speech hesitation might therefore occur in increased frequency when a sender is lying. Another source of deceptive markers are indicators of affective states such as guilt or shame (Kraut, 1980) or



▲ A UNOSOM soldier from Turkey manning a lookout post near UNOSOM II military headquarters in Mogadishu.

'duping delight' (Ekman, 1980). Ekman continued saying, "One might assume that most subjects do not like to deceive and might therefore show some signs of anxiety such as less eye contact, less direct body orientation, and more distance from communication partner (Mehrabian, 1971), as well as a decrease in the use of illustrators (Ekman, 1980). Lastly, it is generally assumed that producing a deceptive message is cognitively more demanding than telling a simple truth. Senders of deceptive messages should therefore show indicators of cognitive effort such as speech pauses, longer response latencies, pupil dilation, and fewer illustrators (Goldman-Eisler, 1968; Kahneman, 1973; Ekman & Friesen, 1972). (pp. 272)

This is important information for any person to have at his or her disposal. This knowledge is simply another life-viewing tool, albeit an extraordinarily powerful one that provides a deeper understanding of one's self and those around. That knowledge tends to change life for the better because when we can literally see and understand the messages from the unconscious, we can truly become the masters of our own destinies and ultimately more skilled in high-risk negotiations that ultimately save lives.

Human beings need and strive for balance. This notion is basic to the **Goodfield**

**Method.** When a person communicates about a subject that has personal meaning or consequences regarding his or her response, there is pressure to express the whole truth. By expressing the total feeling, especially when he or she is ambivalent about an issue, he or she retains or restores balance within. A double message or incongruent message is, in fact, an example of the system trying to express a more complete or congruent message of what he or she really feels.

An old experience in his life has served as a learning point on a conscious level or a **Perceived Primary Event (PPE)** when on an unconscious level. When an event in the present triggers an old decision from the past, that old decision will be reflected in the form of a Non-Verbal Leak if the unconscious message is not congruent with the old decision.

When we perceive incongruence in an individual, it stands out as something that influences our memory of him. Somehow, the behavior we see does not fit into our recollection of our experience of this person. The Non-Verbal Leak is, by definition, a double message; and often we remember or are struck by the inconsistency between what an individual says and how he reflects that on a non-verbal level. **As we look at the incongruence, it can create an imbalance within ourselves because the behavior does not fit.**

The advantages of being able to decode these unconscious messages are obvious. Imagine how the outcomes might have been different if the negotiators, in trying to evaluate negotiated risk factors, could have had a clear picture of the NVL of those who sat across from them. It would have provided a glimpse into the real agenda and desire to resolve the crisis. The outcome might have been different or more quickly found, perhaps saving lives as a result. For example, if your old experiences taught you on an unconscious level (PPE) that it is not safe to speak about what you feel and you, on a conscious level, find yourself wanting to talk about your distrust or disapproval, an inconsistency exists within the system. The system, in an effort to reduce the inconsistency, sends both messages—one on a conscious level and the other on an unconscious level. The messages are presented as incongruence between verbal and non-verbal levels, the non-verbal reflecting the unconscious aspect of what we feel. This is the origin of the Non-Verbal Leak, which originates from a Perceived Primary Event.

The Non-Verbal Leak can be broken down into three basic components: (1) what I initially felt, (2) what I initially wanted to do, and (3) what I actually did. **Taken to the symbolic level for further analysis, we use the concept of Impact, Primary Emotion, and Primary Coping Strategy.** The Non-Verbal Leak is the referential level of behavior. The SL-1, SL-2, or SL-3 is the symbolic level.

The actual non-verbal responses are decoded into their unconscious symbolic meaning, or SL-1, SL-2, SL-3. We may consider again the previous example. You verbally say, "I trust you." Your Non-Verbal Leak, as you say those words, shows, I (eyes open) trust (eyes closed) you (eyes closed, top lip tightened, and swallowing down). The complete message, then, is: "I trust you, but I am anxious about telling you that because in the past I had bad experiences giving my trust to others. I have subsequently learned to avoid these areas, and I close up when they arise in my life." This message, while a true and complete one, is not necessarily the best opening line when trying to make friends or entering into a negotiation. Both messages come out, one heard and the other felt on some level.

There may be various explanations for this behavior but, once again, the issue is to see and hear the communication from both levels of consciousness. Here lies the

basis for successful communication, mediation and negotiations, and human contact.

In crisis and negotiated risk situations, the pressure is higher than in normal circumstances. One can expect the NVL to be more apparent, as both halves of the message seek expression. As adversaries seek compromises or total victory, other NVLs will become more apparent and, therefore, better tools to probe deeper into real agendas.

In order to gain the benefits of this important information, the reader of the NVL must perform one more step, to raise the hard data that has been gathered from the non-verbal level to the symbolic level. Here the raw data is interpreted into clear and usable symbolic meaning. The raw data is the observed repetitive responses noted as the person speaks. The interpretation begins when that information becomes the basis for what is referred to as the symbolic level. When the NVL is being used as a means of gathering deeper underlying motivations of an action, a tactical plan of attack will emerge. The hard referential data of the NVL can be used tactically or clinically, depending on the need and/or objective. The person having the NVL data should consider the moral judgments and their impact on the emotions.

Lennart Sjoberg (1998), of the Center for Risk Research, Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden, makes the following observation:

Although it can be debated whether moral judgment is entirely cognitive, it is certainly closely related to emotional processes. Indignation involves anger, and hence emotional reactions should not be neglected in any discussion of risk perception. They may even be of major importance and a more important source of the societal problems connected with varying risk perception than cognitive.

If negotiations are to be successful, and crisis is to be avoided, understanding is critical. Observations of referential data need to be translated into useable information. That is what the symbolic level of the NVL is. When we decode the total conscious and unconscious messages of the person, real crisis management can take place with the greater possibility of achieving lasting, successful results. **The impact (SL-1) is rooted in any PPE.** It is real in the eyes of the person who experienced it. This shock to the system can be recorded on both levels of consciousness. Moreover, it impacts upon the person on intra-psychic, psycho-physiological, or interpersonal levels.

**The primary emotion (SL-2) to the impact is the first impulse that the person has to the traumatic event.** It is what he *really* wants to do. If his response to the situation is anger in

the SL-2 stage, he wants to express it clearly and directly with no holding back. **The primary coping strategy (SL-3) is what the person really does. It is not what he wants to do.** He may feel rage but he realizes that, if he gives in to these feelings, he could make the situation even worse. This is where the person finds a compromise that works for him at that moment. In psychoanalytic theory the concept of the id, ego, and superego seek to explain the decision-making process. Freud's ideas are hypothetical constructs that add understanding to the decision-making process. Impact, primary emotion, and primary coping strategy also help to decode the decision-making process; however, the SL-1, SL-2, and SL-3 are observable, testable realities. With time and similar perceptions of what his world is like, the person develops repetitive strategies for similar situations. It could be said that the SL-3 is his basic strategy in dealing with those feelings in his life.

But the NVL is reflected not just in the upper part of the person; it is shown throughout the person's body in his movements. This more complete expression of these unconscious messages is referred to as the **BNVL** or the **Body Non-Verbal Leak**.

We are a psycho-physiological system and, therefore, we must consider the total body. In crisis management, conflict resolution, and high-risk negotiations, as you attempt to resolve conflicts it is critical to observe the principals as they express their feelings. The observation of specific behaviors, such as arm and leg movements and breathing patterns, reflect some of the body's movements that must be considered. Reading the total system's reactions is what is meant when we decode the Body Non-Verbal Leak. The observed behavior, when seen in repetitive patterned form, provides the basis for the subsequent interpretation observation.

As a result of close observation and analysis, we can see the physical responses of the system throughout the total body. The BNVL reflects the total recorded factors of a perceived trauma within the system. **This observable unconscious movement forms the basis for part of the negotiation strategy and tactics.**

Primary or traumatic events are a state of imbalance within the individual, and reflect retention, which is a matter of holding tension inside. Our attempts to achieve balance often generate more imbalances. Often our attempt to regain balance results in more imbalances, and we may trip even more and fall. Balance and imbalance are daily factors in our lives and our attempts at resolving conflict. They are reflected in our bodies' actions and functions.

Table 84-1. DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder

- A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following:
1. Failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest.
  2. Deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or pleasure.
  3. Impulsivity or failure to plan ahead.
  4. Irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by physical fights or assaults
  5. Reckless disregard for the safety of self or others
  6. Consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or to honor financial obligations.
  7. Lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another
- B. The individual is at least age 18 years.
- C. There is evidence of conduct disorder (see American Psychiatric Association 1994, p.90) with onset before age 15 years.
- D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of schizophrenia or a manic episode.



▲ Belgian and U.S. members of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in a military convoy.

There are three key concepts in life: insight, action, and risk taking. By taking risks, an individual places himself in a position where something might go wrong; however, something also might go right. **Risk taking is a matter of self-concept.** How you see yourself will affect what you do with regard to the opportunities with which you are presented on a daily basis.

### Sins of the Father

When a stone hits a pond, a series of concentric circles radiate outward. The radiation reflects the intensity of the stone's impact. So it is with PPEs.

Imagine a few small boats positioned at various points on a pond, one of the boats exactly positioned at the epicenter, another at the first concentric circle, and still another at the second, and so on. Of course, at the fifth or sixth concentric circle, the small boat will experience less distortion and impact than the boat at the center. If there were people on these imaginary boats, they would have sketchier primary information about the causality, origin, and implication as a result of their differing distances from ground zero. The consequence would be an increased speculation on the part of

those at greater distances. So it is with the **Historical Interactive Non-Verbal Leak (HINVL)**. As the HINVL's definition suggests, past PPEs impact individuals from one generation to the next. "The attempt to find a peaceful settlement to the difficulties facing the Middle East seems bogged down because of two fundamental issues, the HINVL, and the inability to be open to difference" (Goodfield, 1999).

When an individual has a major PPE that is not resolved in some satisfactory way, it will be passed along to the children in the family and their children and theirs until resolution is found in the perception of that individual. The primary mode of transmission is through non-verbal messages that reflect the old strategies that resulted from the old decisions in relationship to the event that was initially perceived as a traumatic event.

Actions, when reflecting an HINVL, are often taken but are usually not questioned. When they are questioned, the remarks made about them are usually vague, reflecting more of a feeling tone that says, "I don't know why I do this or feel this way. We (fill in a family, clan, or tribal name) have done this in this way for generations. We have been always stoic and held our deeper

feelings inside." These remarks reflect values and traditions. **When they don't result in repetitive pathological responses to the environment, these actions usually go on unchallenged by the unconscious mind.**

When, however, a vague feeling of uneasiness or discomfort impacts the person daily, the HINVL may be pushing an unresolved issue from someone else's past. In that sense, we are in the presence of the past, the boat at the epicenter. Ultimately, the person here and now has an NVL that shows his unconscious signal of an emotional need. We need contact and affection but, if we have been taught that we of this family are unable to be successful at achieving real contact and intimacy, then we either don't try or, when we do, we somehow unconsciously sabotage our efforts. The HINVL is an unconscious self-fulfilling prophecy that shapes our lives and influences the directions we take.

Deep-seated distrust based on old historical unresolved traumas, sabotages peace negotiations on a regular basis, and the lives of those who suffer from the absence of that peace. If there is a solution to this situation, it will come about when people, as negotiators, put the idea of peace before unconscious needs.

Violent history, violent role models, and a profound sense of hopelessness create a dilemma. There are two basic paths from which to choose. Withdraw into despair and hopelessness, and find solace in what religious belief might offer. The second path is to give vent to the repressed rage that can accompany the daily injustice found in daily existence. This becomes the breeding ground for Mohammed Farah Aideed that infests the streets and waters off of Somalia.

Let us look at a former Somali leader, Mohammed Farah Aideed, as he is illustrative of many of those struggling to find balance in the unbalanced world in which they live.

As Walter Clarke, Deputy Special Envoy, said of former warlord Aideed, "If you are a warlord, I guess you need a war."

Aideed saw himself not as a warlord but as *the* top warlord fighting his own battle for power over historical enemies and forces from the past.

Let us now consider the NVL of Mohammed Farah Aideed and the psychological dynamics that drove his behavior in the Somalia situation.

## Mohammed Farah Aideded's Psychological Dynamics and the Negotiation Process

### The NVL of Mohammed Farah Aideded

1. Eyes open
2. Deepening lines between eyes
3. Top lip tightens, masseter muscles pulse
4. Lines next to nose tighten and deepen
5. Eyes open wider in anger

### SL-1, SL-2, SL-3 of Mohammed Farah Aideded

SL-1 = Shock, shown in large eyes

SL-2 = Anger out, shown in strong lines near mouth and tight top lip

SL-3 = Controlled pressure, then impulsive and often explosive action, then a swallow down.

When looking at General Aideded, one is immediately struck by the two deep lines between his eyes. A few conclusions can be drawn from these lines. When looking at his masseter muscles, the blockage of aggressive impulses can be inferred. This blocked aggression was later given full vent. He was a person under a lot of pressure and who internalized even more. He could be seen as a Type A personality as well as an antisocial personality or psychopath.



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can be inferred. This blocked aggression was later given full vent. He was a person under a lot of pressure and who internalized even more. He could be seen as a Type A personality as well as an antisocial personality or psychopath.

How did pressure in the negotiation process affect his behavior? As has been pointed out in the general discussion of the NVL, pressure can and often does reinforce old decisions and strategies made as a child.

What would those decisions and strategies as a child likely be?

1. Hang on in the face of intolerable hardship.
2. Pressure will justify the violence hidden just below the surface.
3. The views of others are irrelevant obstacles to gaining more power.
4. Violence and revenge are justified, appropriate, and necessary.

A post hoc psychological diagnosis and evaluation of the deceased General Aideded could increase the understanding of the negotiation difficulties that took place in Somalia and the challenges it faces today.

Mohammed Farah Aideded was a charismatic character who, based upon his known behavior and actions, fits the clinical criteria of a psychopath as defined by the American Psychiatric Association diagnostic criteria. What are the criteria of a psychopath?

J. Reid Meloy (1995) discloses important details on antisocial personality disorders for our studies: "Antisocial personality disorder is the most reliably diagnosed condition among the personality disorders, yet treatment efforts are notoriously difficult." He goes on to present two tables, one describing the criteria for antisocial personality disorder (Table 84-1.) and, in a second table, the revised psychopathy checklist (Table 84-2.).

What is clear with 20/20 hindsight is that the behavior of General Aideded fits the clinical features that distinguish the psychopath from other forms of narcissistic personality disorder. He was characterized by aggression and power in his interactions. He manifested sadistic and cruel behavior toward others. He had no interest in showing, rationalizing, or morally trying to justify his behavior. There was no adherence to any value system other than the exploitative aggressive use of power. He showed no conscience and no ego, allowing famine to devastate his people. He appeared to know what others thought, but he did not care what they felt.

This information in the hands of General Anthony Zinni, Director of Operations 1992–1993, might have built a tactical plan that would have incorporated this critical information into his negotiation strategies. The situation was not helped when General Aideded's behavior was labeled by the United Nations as criminal. This would make any psychopath become defensive, less responsive, and ultimately more dangerous and unpredictable at the negotiation table.

General Zinni in the 2002 *Frontline* TV program *Ambush in Mogadishu*, commented on the UN action saying: "I think that the resolution (UN) to declare Aideded a criminal was ridiculous first of all, and secondly, we were now in some kind of counter-insurgency operation or war" (Cran, 2002). This prophetic observation was to foreshadow the continued deterioration of the events in Somalia.

What were General Zinni, Robert Oakley, Walter Clarke, and a host of others up against in attempting to negotiate with Mohammed Farah Aideded? Two factors come to mind. **First, as an antisocial**

**personality, Aideded developed with certain characteristics.** Meloy (1988) states:

In the child's subsequent development, two separate processes coexist. One is characterized by a profound detachment from all relationships and from affective experience, while the other is a more object-related path characterized by sadistic attempts to bond with others through the exercise of power and destructiveness.

The psychopathic patient never becomes aware of other people as separate individuals with feelings of their own. Hence these patients do not develop a capacity for depressive anxieties or for guilt stemming from concern that their actions can hurt others.

The second unknown factor at that time was that the Al Qaeda terror network led by Usama Bin Laden was hastily providing arms to fight and not negotiators to find solutions to apparent differences.

What then would have been the best strategies the United States and the United Nations could have taken when attempting to negotiate with Mohammed Farah Aideded? Any negotiation approach that fed his ambitious need for power at the same time searching for others with more of a true commitment to peace and redevelopment in that war-torn region. This is easy to suggest and much harder to accomplish, given the players then and even now in 2009. Somalia's new leader, President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, faces the same uphill struggle as was faced by others caught in the brier patch called Somalia.

### Concluding Thoughts

The United States Navy's attempted negotiation for the release of Captain Richard Phillips of the *Maersk Alabama* in April 2009, is emblematic of the difficulty faced by the West. Be it on sea or land, negotiating the non-negotiable is never easy. **A failed state means a breakdown of the structures of legitimate governmental power on all levels.** Warlords on land fight each other for power and position while pirates plunder shipping lanes with virtual impunity.

Those involved in high-risk international negotiations face in two directions at the same time. Direction one is toward their capitals or the headquarters of their negotiation agencies. They must also face the persons across the tables that are also confronted with similar tasks. To suggest

“A man with much to think about and much more to do. Sheik Sharif was a former schoolteacher, who stood up to the warlords who fought for control of Mogadishu. He faces not only the problems of a failed state, he also faces Usama Bin Laden who reportedly called for him to be ‘dethroned, fought, and removed with armed force.’”  
—CNN, March 19, 2009



▲Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (right) meets with Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the new and different type of “President” of Somalia

Table 84-2.  
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised

1. Glibness/superficial charm
2. Grandiose sense of self-worth
3. Need for stimulation/proneness to boredom
4. Pathological lying
5. Conning/manipulating
6. Lack of remorse or guilt
7. Shallow affect
8. Callous/lack of empathy
9. Parasitic life-style
10. Poor behavioral controls
11. Promiscuous sexual behavior
12. Early behavioral problems
13. Lack of realistic long-term goals
14. Impulsivity
15. Irresponsibility
16. Failure to accept responsibility for own actions
17. Many short-term marital relationships
18. Juvenile delinquency
19. Revocation of conditional release
20. Criminal versatility

Source. Hare, R.: *The Hare psychopathy Checklist-Revised Manual*. Toronto, Multi-Health Systems, 1991.

that those involved with such colossal tasks puts more demands upon themselves and on their colleagues may seem unfair or unrealistic. It is not.

In the long run, this effort will save time, energy, and perhaps even lives if the true agendas of all parties present are surfaced, discussed in candor, and incorporate both the conscious and unconscious realities that bring them together and divide them at the same time. The events in Mogadishu, with its drought and starvation and problematic leadership, points to the futility of the situation in general. Mohammed Farah Aideded is gone.

A clinically proven psychopath is no longer in control. The “government” (mostly in name only) still is struggling with other clans and desperate individuals. Those people are seeking power and position in an internal political struggle against other self-serving warlords that produces little hope for successful change. Sometimes the most successful thing a negotiator can do is to push away from the table when those across from him are showing in their actions, both verbally and non verbally, that it is a game no one can win. The Non-Verbal Leak can provide that clear data and direction. Perhaps a small hope comes from America’s war with Al Qaeda, which still has representation in that area. As long as there is a perceived threat of an Al Qaeda presence, there will be an interest on the part of the United States and the United Nations. Hope for these desperate people will only come when others see self-interest in the region.

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▲ Maersk Alabama Capt. Richard Phillips, right, stands alongside Cmdr. Frank Castellano, commanding officer of USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) on Sunday, April 12, 2009, after U.S. Naval Forces rescued Phillips off the coast of Somalia. (U.S. Navy/MCT)

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After studying this article, participants should be better able to do the following:

- 1. Better understand the key role that personality plays in international crisis.
2. Understand the dilemma faced by international organizations attempting to bring aid to this region.
3. Understand the role of the unconscious process in world affairs.
4. Understand this historical development of the regional conflict.
5. Gain insight into methods of "reading" Non-Verbal Leaks.

KEYWORDS:

terrorism, warlord, civil war, non-state actor, Aideed, Sahnoun, Mahdi, Oakley, Clarke, NGO, UNITAF, UNOSOM, Restore Hope, Usama bin Laden, Boutros Boutros Ghali, Siad Barre, United Nations, Clinton, Jonah, NVL, Non-Verbal Leak, unconscious

TARGET AUDIENCE:

Psychological professionals

PROGRAM LEVEL:

Basic

DISCLOSURE:

The authors have nothing to disclose.

PREREQUISITES:

None

ABSTRACT

Following a civil war and a drought, 350,000 Somalis had died by 1992. In response to a United Nations request for help, the United States sent Marines to secure the environment (UNOSOM—Operation Restore Hope). This initial effort was followed by UNOSOM II, a more ambitious UN mandate to disarm militias and reconcile political factions. This paper examines the decision-making, the effect of conflicting personalities, and the role of the unconscious as seen in the Non-Verbal Leak. The personality of former President Mohammed Farah Aideed is analyzed in the context of the aforementioned conflict. An explanation of the relevance (or lack of one) of the interlocutors, the negotiating styles and venues, and the negotiating objectives is discussed.

POST CE TEST QUESTIONS (Answer the following questions after reading the article)

- 1 The implementation of policy (or working toward goals) cannot assume either cooperation or understanding from the other involved parties, even if "it's good for them." In this case, the U.S. goal was to provide humanitarian assistance. However, this was deemed NOT threatening by those who wanted to control the country.
a. True
b. False
2 Success will depend on understanding the others' own objectives in the venture. To reach an adequate level of understanding, it is necessary to know the influences at work. Some will have originated from historical events, family and tribal (or associative) ties, and obligations. Traditional tribal ties and obligations are more important than loyalty to the idea of a nation, as loyalty is too abstract when day-to-day survival is at stake.
a. True
b. False
3 Accommodating the other party's desires into a final solution is the only path to a sustainable situation. Political reconciliation based on power rather than the self-interests of the negotiating parties will last only through force of arms.
a. True
b. False
4 The head emphasis movements, muscle tension in the eyes, and eyebrow lifts are significant predictors of recurrent CHD in univariate analyses. However, when the nonverbal indices were examined in multivariate analyses with other behavioral variables, the nonverbal behaviors were no longer significant.
a. True
b. False
5 NVL pressure does not reinforce old decisions and strategies made as a child.
a. True
b. False
6 Mohammed Farah Aideed was a charismatic character who, based upon his known behavior and actions, fits the clinical criteria of a psychopath as defined by the American Psychiatric Association diagnostic criteria.
a. True
b. False

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